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Latinos in the Major Leagues from 1920 to 1939:
A Human Capital Approach
Tom Cullen *
ABSTRACT. Economists frequently study the determinants of baseball players’ wages.
Researchers usually control for measures of productivity such as the player's batting
average, home runs, and runs batted in, education, age, and experience. This study differs
from standard studies in that it considers players’ country of origin in the 1920s and 1930s,
years before Jackie Robinson’s debut. It uses information on player productivity from
Baseball-Reference.com, player salary information from the Baseball Hall of Fame and
Museum (graciously shared by its compiler), and information on college attendance
provided by Who's Who in Baseball (held at the Joyce Sports Collection, Notre Dame
University). It concludes that although there is documented evidence of racial
discrimination against Latinos, the discrimination probably did not take the form of lower
salaries.

I. Introduction
“Who is the greatest manager, really, Luque or Mike Gonzalez?-I think
they are equal” (Hemingway 1952, 5). Hemingway, a resident of Cuba at
the time he wrote this passage in The Old Man and the Sea, had first-hand
experience with baseball in a Latin country. He even built a sandlot for
aspiring local players and his children (Robinson 2008). Baseball in Latin
America and the Caribbean markedly increased in popularity over thirty
years before Hemingway's residence. Havana had a professional circuit
before the U.S. National League was formed (Bjarkman 2015). The two
managers Hemingway referenced, Dolf Luque and Mike Gonzalez,
entered Major League Baseball in 1914 and flourished. Luque led the
Major Leagues in earned run average and wins in 1923; Gonzalez was the
first Latin player to record more than one home run in a season (BaseballReference 2014). Luque and Gonzalez were not alone. Players from Cuba,
Mexico, and Venezuela were the largest foreign cohort in the Major
Leagues from 1920 to 1939 (Baseball-Reference 2014).
Luque and Gonzalez's entrance to the majors marks a departure from
Major League policy. Major League Baseball was segregated by

*The author would like to thank Dr. Michael Haupert for salary data. Studies of 20th
Century American baseball would not be possible without his database.
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gentlemen's agreement until Jackie Robinson and Larry Doby stepped on
Major League diamonds in 1947 (Baseball-Reference 2014). Major
League Baseball's commissioner, Kenesaw Landis, quashed attempts to
integrate baseball during his tenure, which ended in 1944 (Pietrusza 2001,
XV). Players from Latin America, Hawaii, and Europe, however, were
allowed to play if they were light-skinned (Baseball-Reference 2014).
Dark-skinned Cuban players like Pepe Abreu were relegated to the Negro
Leagues, but Gonzalez and Luque were eligible for Major League rosters.
It is debatable, however, whether light-skinned players were better
off. Several Cuban players had to be reassigned to the minor leagues
because pitchers would throw at them rather than over home plate. Latin
players faced death threats, as did the scouts that would bring them
(Considine 1940, 19-24). The reason for the Latin influx into Major
League Baseball is arbitrage. Joe Cambria, head of scouting for
Washington, thought Cuba was the next source for a “$25 a week” star.
Bob Considine, a journalist for Collier's Weekly, concluded that Latin
players in Major League Baseball received “rock bottom pay” despite
being “extraordinarily expert at the game” (Considine 1940, 19).
This study examines whether Latin players faced salary
discrimination as Considine claimed. Brown, Gabriel, and Surdam
provide a model of what determines player salaries. They contend that
performance, age, position, and experience determine a player's salary,
and cite Becker and Mincer's seminal works (Brown et. al. 2012, 449).
This study attempts to link salaries of non-pitchers to individual statistics,
college attendance, position, experience, age, and team as Brown et. al.
did. In addition, it will control for country of origin.

II. Literature Review
Kevin Christiano's (1988) study warrants review on multiple levels. First,
he established a method to test race discrimination in Major League
Baseball. If salary discrimination were present, a comparable minority
player would be paid less than a white counterpart. He found no evidence
of discrimination for players negotiating contracts in 1987. He concluded
that free agency, the ability of a player to switch teams after contract
expiration, mitigated salary discrimination. Baseball before 1976, the
Reserve Clause era, allowed teams to discriminate (Christiano 1988, 136138). The Reserve Clause was a clause in player contracts that allowed
Major League franchises to unilaterally retain a player's services
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(Rottenberg 1956, 246). If Major League Baseball used a salary
competition regime, discrimination probably would not exist.
[T]o discriminate by race is to risk the loss of an entire class of
workers. It is to pass up all the benefits that workers of the
undesired racial category might bring. Even worse,
discrimination leaves these benefits to one's competitors. Thus,
according to theory, with competition come powerful
disincentives to the practice of racism (Christiano 1988, 138).
During the Reserve Clause era, Major League franchises did not use
salary competition. The Reserve Clause allowed franchises to exercise
monopsony power over their respective players. Moreover, it allowed
franchises to select players of desired races (Christiano 1988, 138).
Christiano acknowledged the possibility of discrimination the Reserve
Clause era.
Considine's (1940) article in Collier's Weekly provides first-hand
evidence of discrimination. Considine claimed that Latin foreign players
were “so naïve and loved the game so much that they would sign up for
absolutely nothing” (i.e. they would accept very low salaries). Considine
claimed the migration of Latin players from Cuba, Venezuela, and
Mexico was the experiment of an ambitious scout, Joe Cambria, for the
Washington Senators. Cambria viewed Latin players as a cheap
alternative to native talent, deeming them “future Joe DiMaggio(s) for
$25 a week” (Considine 1940, 19). Considine concluded that Latin
players faced lower pay and poor treatment:
They get beanballs thrown at their heads by closed-shop (and
closedbrained) rivals. They face pitchers who willingly will
throw away their arms bearing down on them in an effort to
escape the "ignominy" of yielding a hit to them. They get a
measure of grasssingeing abuse from the "jockeys" on the enemy
bench. From their own team they get rock-bottom pay, and from
many of their own teammates they get a wintry ostracism. Those
who want to befriend them are halted by the differences in
languages (Considine 1940, 19).
The model presented below will attempt to test Considine's claims of
discrimination in the form of lower salaries.
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Determining salaries requires estimating human capital. Human
capital estimation requires a review of Jacob Mincer's seminal work.
Mincer laid out an empirical specification for wage determination: ln Es
= ln E0 + rS + $1 t – $2 t² where ln Es is the full earnings capacity for a
worker in logarithmic form, ln E0 is the earnings capacity for a worker
with no experience and no schooling, S is the number of years of
schooling, and t is the number of years of experience (Mincer 1974, 84).
Mincer used a log-linear functional form because income naturally has a
skewed distribution (Mincer 1974, 24-25).
Although Becker's approach was similar to Mincer's, Becker's use of
age is integral in this study. Becker's age-earnings profile links age,
schooling, and earnings over the typical life cycle. He found that earnings
rise with age at a decreasing rate (Becker 1964, 228-233).
Lee Douthit's interview is a pillar supporting the theoretical
framework behind this study. 1920 to 1939 had a marked increase in the
number of players who attended college (Drowne and Huber 2004, 32).
Douthit, a University of California graduate, told Baseball Magazine that
college attendance had a positive effect on prospective players entering
the major leagues.
[A college player]… enjoys other advantages. His strict training
at the hands of a college coach has taught him the necessity of
keeping in physical condition. The glamour of big cities means
less to him than to the country boy who has never been away
from home. He is more likely to view baseball as a profession. In
short, he is further advanced than the average sandlot ball player
(Douthit 1929, 448).
Douthit claimed college players earn higher salaries because of
superior development; he warned, however, about skepticism from fellow
players and owners (Douthit 1929, 448).
Clifford Harvey, of Baseball Magazine, affirmed Douthit's claims.
Harvey noted that 100 former college graduates were in the Major League
Baseball in 1929, 18 of which made the “tremendous jump” to the major
leagues without minor league training (Harvey 1930, 297). He concluded
that college would increase the chances of a player 'making good' since
college made “'natural ball player[s]” (Harvey 1930, 297).
Alexandre Olbrecht provided a link between education and player
salaries using human capital estimation. He found that college players
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who negotiated contracts in 2005 were paid an 8.3% premium; however,
his result was not statistically significant (Olbrecht 2007, 981-985). He
provided a theory as to why college players receive a premium on
contracts:
[H]uman capital theory suggests that educational investments
will make a worker more productive, raise his marginal product
and eventually his lifetime earnings. By attending college, a
player might develop into a more rounded individual who is more
cognizant of team goals and committed to sacrificing personal
statistics for wins. Teams cognizant of this theory may be willing
to pay wage premiums for the attributes described. Ultimately
individuals deciding between college and the minor leagues are
more interested in which track will yield the largest lifetime
income stream. A documented and significantly large earnings
premium could serve to offset the opportunity costs of schooling
and be relevant information to players deciding between the
minors and college (Olbrecht 2007, 982).
Olbrecht's reasoning restates Douthit and Harvey's claims about
human capital. While he applied it to modern players, Olbrecht's use of
college attendance as a proximate variable for educational attainment is
the avenue to verify Douthit and Harvey’s claims.
Scully attempted several times (in 1974, 1989, and 1995) to determine
whether Reserve Clause players were paid their marginal contributions.
He linked franchise revenues to win percentage, which is determined by
player productivity (Scully 1989, 154). He applied Mincer's model to
salaries during the Reserve Clause era and concluded the Reserve Clause
depressed Major League salaries.
Brown, Gabriel, and Surdam applied Mincer's study among others to
determine player salaries for the New York Yankees from 1919-1941
(Brown et al. 2012, 449). Although they used panel estimation, more
sophisticated statistics, and examined only Yankees players, they offered
a framework to employ offensive statistics in human capital estimation.
The following model uses three offensive metrics: home runs, batting
average, and runs batted in.
Simon Rottenberg, in his evaluation of the Reserve Clause, pointed
to franchises inflating salaries to dominate the talent pool. The absence
of an amateur draft left rookies free to negotiate with franchises
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(Baseball-Reference 2014). Rottenberg contended that the largest
population centers with large revenue bases would attract the most
capable players and would erode competitive balance. Rottenberg inferred
that the Reserve Clause was intended to mitigate this effect, but
concluded that the talent distribution was inequitable (Rottenberg 1956,
247). Moreover, the New York market (the Yankees and the Giants)
dominated the talent pool during the era using their large revenue bases
to offer higher salaries (Rottenberg 1956, 247). Players who played for
either the Giants or the Yankees received a salary premium, according to
Rottenberg.
Glenn, McGarrity and Weller also examined player position's effect
on tenure and salary. They found catchers and players who played
shortstop or second base (middle infielders) were traded less frequently
because of increased firm-specific human capital. In other words, because
of catchers' and middle infielders' defensive prowess, they stay with
franchises longer. A possible result could be higher pay (Glenn et. al.
2001, 92). Holding offensive productivity fixed, catchers and middle
infielders could be paid a premium.

III. Model
This human capital model is based on the premise that a player's pay is
determined by offensive statistics and other observable characteristics
such as age, position, and experience. A traditional approach of
measuring human capital would be to measure a player's marginal revenue
product, or the additional revenue generated from an additional unit of an
input (Rottenberg 1956, 916). The Reserve Clause allowed Major League
franchises to fix salaries of players at no less than 75% of the current
year's salary (Rottenberg 1956, 246). Players' only recourse was not to
play. There is a strong presumption that the Reserve Clause allowed
franchises to exercise monopsony power and depress salaries. If teams
had complete freedom to fix salaries, the question is whether teams set
salaries with a standard method. Surdam, Brown, and Gabriel found that
Reserve Clause players for the New York Yankees were paid on a
systematic, productivity-related basis (Brown et. al. 2012, 449). Players
were paid according to productivity, although they did not receive their
marginal revenue product (Scully 1995, 43).
Scully, Olbrecht, and Brown et. al. all used batting average and home
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runs to study players of the period. Runs batted in were not included in
other studies, but has explanatory power. One concern about adding runs
batted in is multicollinearity. But while each home run constitutes a run
batted in, runs batted in are not perfectly correlated with home runs.
Players like Paul Waner ranked in the bottom quartile of home runs, but
ranked in the top 50 of runs batted in. Also, runs scored are directly
related to wins. Wins increase attendance, which boosts revenue. Higher
revenue, as was the case with the New York Yankees and Giants,
translates to higher salaries (Blass 1992, 261).
Applying measures of productivity is the first step. The next step is
education, as is common in human capital estimations. The effect of
college attendance on salaries has been answered to a degree. Olbrecht
found that college players from 2005 received an 8.3% premium on
contracts. This finding is promising, but does not preclude further
investigation. As Douthit pointed out, owners and teammates were leery
of integrating college players (Douthit, 449). College players may have
possessed stronger bargaining leverage and could find lucrative
employment elsewhere. The Reserve Clause could have encouraged
college players to use this option.
The next variable is player position. The importance of player
position, or the defensive assignment of a player, has a mixed history in
the literature. Christiano, Glenn et. al., Brown et. al, and Blass used
outfield as a variable in salary determination (Brown 454); (Blass 2001,
265); (Christiano, 139-140). Olbrecht and Scully did not include the
variable. This study includes middle infielders and catchers as Glenn et.
al. did. As stated above, catchers and middle infielders are traded less
often and have higher firm-specific human capital (Glenn et. al. 2001,
92).
Experience, age, and age-squared appear in virtually every human
capital salary model. Mincer pointed out that age increases the
explanatory value of earnings analyses, but concluded experience was a
better fit (Mincer 1974, 83-84). Becker included age and experience to
determine earnings in his seminal work (Becker 1964, 228-233). Scully
pointed out that experience is one of the four factors that are crucial to
salary determination (Scully 1989, 156). Every study cited in this study
uses some combination of age and experience to estimate salaries.
This study applies the above measures to the human capital
framework developed by Becker and Mincer. According to the
framework, a worker is paid according to his productivity, which is linked
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to the amount of a worker's human capital. With Haupert's database of
salaries for the period, a link can be estimated between a player's human
capital and salary. The empirical specification of salaries is as follows:
ln(S)= $0 + $1COLLEGE + $2CATCHER + $3MIDDLE INFIELD
+ $4EXPERIENCE + $5NEW YORK + $6BATTING AVERAGE
+ $7RBI + $8HOME RUN + $9AGE + $10AGE² + $11LATIN + g

(1)

The dependent variable is the natural log of a player's salary for a
corresponding season. This is standard in the literature for salary
determination in the human capital framework (Mincer 1974, 84). The
key independent variable, LATIN, denotes a player's country of origin in
binary form; 1 for those born in Cuba, Mexico, or Venezuela and 0 for
those born elsewhere. COLLEGE, is a binary variable that is a 1 for
players who attended college and 0 for those who did not. CATCHER and
MIDDLE INFIELD are also binary variables that assign a 1 value for
those who played those positions and 0 for those who did not.
TABLE 1–Expected Variable Coefficients, and Variable Definitions
Variable

Variable Description

Expected Sign

LOG REAL SALARY

Salary Adjusted for Inflation in
Logarithmic Form

LATIN

Players of Latin Origin

-

COLLEGE

Players Who Attended College

+

CATCHER

Players Who Were Primarily1 Catchers

+

1

Dependent
Variable

MIDDLE INFIELD

Players Who Played Primarily Second
Base or Shortstop

+

NEW YORK

Played in New York Market2

+

EXPERIENCE

Years of Experience in Major League
Baseball

+

BATTING AVERAGE

Hits/At Bats; Minimum 100 at Bats

+

RBI

Number of RBI’s

+

HOME RUN

Number of Home Runs

+

AGE

Player’s Age at Start of Season

+

AGE-SQUARED
Player’s Age Squared
1. Position dummies were determined whether the player played the majority of games
at a position.
2. Whether the player played for either the New York Yankees or the New York Giants
for any part of a given season
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Holding offensive performance fixed, these players were more important
defensively. NEW YORK is another binary variable that denotes a
player's presence in the New York market. BATTING AVERAGE, RBI,
and HOME RUN are statistics that document a player's offensive
productivity. BATTING AVERAGE is the number of hits divided by the
number of at-bats. RBI and HOME RUN are statistics that record the
number of runs batted in and home runs for a given season. Age and agesquared are discrete variables that document a player's age at the
beginning of a given season.
The model above was estimated with panel regression with robust
standard errors to correct for clustering. Adjusting for clustering is
intended to correct for multiple observations on one player.

IV. Data
Michael Haupert, of the University of Wisconsin LaCrosse, generously
shared his database of nominal salaries from 1920 to 1939. Haupert
assembled his database from contract information held at the National
Baseball Hall of Fame and Museum. Several adjustments had to be made
to conform to standard human capital estimation. Observations needed to
be adjusted for inflation or deleted if offensive production statistics were
not available.
Mincer's second variable, education, had to be transformed into
college attendance. Mincer's model used years of schooling rather than
college attendance. College attendance is a proxy since it is the closest,
verifiable representation of schooling. College records were assembled
from the Who's Who in Major League Baseball from 1920-1939 at
University of Notre Dame's Rare and Special Collections.
As stated above, offensive productivity is preferable in human capital
estimation for baseball. An all-encompassing statistic such as WARP
(Wins Above Replacement Player) would be ideal since it captures a
player’s relative value (Baseball-Reference 2014). But sophisticated
measures like WARP were not available to management from 1920 to
1939. This study uses traditional measures of productivity that were
available to management. These data were available through BaseballReference.com and were merged with Haupert's salary database. Players
with less than 100 at-bats were excluded, as were all pitchers. Players
with few at-bats skew regression coefficients, particularly, offensive
statistics (Brown et. al., 456), and pitchers are judged on a different set of
statistics.
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The following table presents the summary of statistics gleaned from
Haupert's database, The Who's Who in Major League Baseball, and
Baseball-Reference.com.
TABLE 2–Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Variable Description

Maximum Minimum

Mean

Standard
Deviation

REAL
SALARY

Salary Adjusted for
Inflation

$70,093.46

$895.52

LATIN*

Players of Latin
Origin

1

0

0.013

0.114

COLLEGE

Players Who
Attended College

1

0

0.332

0.471

CATCHER**

Players Who Were
Primarily** Catchers

1

0

0.161

0.367

MIDDLE
INFIELD

Players Who Played
Primarily** 2nd Base
or Shortstop

1

0

0.268

0.443

NEW YORK

Played in New York
Market***

1

0

0.193

0.395

EXPERIENCE Years of Experience
in the Majors

23

0

5.974

4.191

$6,620.86 $5,369.63

BATTING
AVERAGE

Hits/At Bats;
Minimum 100 At
Bats

0.424

0.067

0.290

0.039

RBI

Number of RBI’s

185

0

55.607

32.713

HOME RUN

Number of Home
Runs

60

0

6.177

8.148

AGE

Player’s Age at Start
of Season

41

18

28.547

4.072

AGEPlayer’s Age
1681
324
831.530
237.400
SQUARED
Squared
*
Player was born in Cuba, Mexico, or Venezuela
** Position dummies were determined whether the player played the majority of
games at a position.
*** Whether the player played the year for either the New York Yankees or the New
York Giants
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V. Results/Discussion
TABLE 3–OLS Regression Results: Hitters From 1920-1939:
Dependent Variable: ln(Salary)
Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

P-Value

CONSTANT

4.333***

0.598

0.000

LATIN

0.162

0.155

0.295

COLLEGE

0.080***

0.036

0.026

CATCHER

0.075

0.050

0.139

MIDDLE INFIELD

0.115***

0.034

0.001

EXPERIENCE

0.070***

0.006

0.000

NEW YORK

0.134***

0.040

0.001

BATTING AVERAGE

0.462

0.366

0.207

RBI

0.004***

0.001

0.000

HOME RUN

0.015***

0.004

0.000

AGE

0.227***

0.044

0.000

-0.004***

0.001

0.000

AGE-SQUARED
N

2358

R-Squared

0.515

Adjusted R-Squared

0.513

F-Statistic (11, 2346)

200.5

*
Denotes significance at p<.10
** Denotes significance at p<.05
*** Denotes significance at p<.01

All variables except for LATIN, CATCHER, and BATTING
AVERAGE were statistically significant at the p<.05 level. R-Squared
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and Adjusted R-Squared were .515 and .513, respectively. Approximately
51% of variation of salaries from 1920 to 1939 has been explained by this
model. The regression could be improved if we had information on other
variables such as eyesight, work ethic, and speed. Unfortunately, data on
these things are either unavailable or would raise a problem of
multicollinearity (Scully 1989, 156).
The main variable of interest, LATIN, was not statistically
significant. A possible reason could be the limited number of
observations. As stated above, 39 Latin players were on Major League
rosters from 1920 to 1939. The 100-at bat constraint limited the number
of Latin players in the regression to ten. Many Latin players were shuffled
out of line-ups or summarily dismissed before they could reach one
hundred at-bats. Alternatively, it could mean that discrimination against
Latin players did not take the form of lower salaries.
An additional home run would garner a 1.5% pay raise. An additional
run batted in (RBI) would garner a .4% pay raise. The fear, as stated
above, is that the interrelation of performance variables like HOME RUN
and RBI would add little explanatory power and present a problem of
multicollinearity. It appears the size of Haupert's database mitigated this
effect.
BATTING AVERAGE appears to have the highest magnitude of
every variable. Even though BATTING AVERAGE is not statistically
significant, it still has some explanatory power. Not including BATTING
AVERAGE in this regression would have sizably decreased R-Squared
and Adjusted R-Squared. The BATTING AVERAGE coefficient,
however, has no practical significance with its current interpretation. The
coefficient on BATTING AVERAGE shows a 1 point increase in batting
average yields a 46% premium on a given salary. But a one point
increase in batting average is impossible. A batting average has never and
probably will never exceed .5 for a player with over 100 at-bats. The
maximum batting average in Haupert's database is Rogers Hornsby, who
hit .424 in 1924. Dividing the coefficient by 1000 would adjust the
coefficient to the correct change in batting average: .001. If Hornsby hit
.434, or ten points higher, he would garner a .46% salary premium.
COLLEGE was positive and statistically significant. A college player
was paid 8% more than a non-college player with identical productivity.
This is consistent with the claims of Harvey, Douthit, and Olbrecht.
Further, the COLLEGE coefficient is the same magnitude as Olbrecht's
finding. College attendance appears to be rewarded at similar rates across
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decades.
Age and experience variables were all statistically significant as
Brown et al., Fort, Scully, and Olbrecht found. AGE and EXPERIENCE
were positive, but AGE-SQUARED was negative. This indicates that
salary rises as a player ages, but the salary rises at a decreasing rate. This
is consistent with Mincer's work and the age-earnings profile (Becker
1964, 230-235).
As Rottenberg predicted, players in the New York market were paid
13% more than players from other teams. The maximum in Haupert's
database is Babe Ruth's salaries from 1922 through 1933. New York
players like Edd Roush, Lou Gehrig, Robert O'Farrell, and Frank Frisch
all ranked in the top 70 salaries (Baseball-Reference 2014). This
estimation is consistent with Rottenberg's assertion.

VII. Conclusions and Further Research
The coefficient on LATIN appears to dispel the notion that salary
discrimination was present in the 1920's and 1930's. Although there is
documented evidence of racial discrimination against Latinos, the
discrimination probably did not take the form of lower salaries as the
LATIN coefficient is indistinguishable from zero. Most of Cambria's
Cuban recruits did not appear in this estimation because of the 100 at-bat
constraint. Most Latin players were shuffled in and out of line-ups, never
reaching 100 at-bats in a season. The only players included in the
regression were the players that “made good.” Latin players who did not
appear to be the next “$25 a week” star were summarily dismissed
(Considine 1940, 19).
The results are consistent with human capital theory. Every variable
besides LATIN, CATCHER, and BATTING AVERAGE yielded the
expected sign and was statistically significant. College players were paid
8% higher than their non-college counterparts, the equivalent of hitting
an extra six home runs. It also appears that players were paid on a
systematic, productivity-related basis (Brown et. al. 2012, 459).
Further research could use a different choice of performance
variables. Career slugging percentage, according to Scully, has more
explanatory power than batting average. “Career slugging average is a
better measure than that of the previous season because hitting fluctuates
from season to season. A career average contains more information about
ability than performance in a single year” (Scully 1989, 156).
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The most documented evidence of discrimination was discrimination
from fans (Revel and Munoz 2009, 2). Further research could focus on
revenues for the teams that employed Latin talent. Teams like the
Washington Senators were known as havens for Latin talent (Considine
1940, 19). Those teams could have experienced lower attendance and
lower gate receipts as a result.
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